keep trainers until the 2011 deadline with stability NB, Obama Good Politics (likely Energy Bill, climate accesses imperialism) CP TEXT: The United States federal government should withdraw military and police presence from Iraq except for keeping forces for capability-building: aiding in the training, equipping, advising, and operational support, character-building: partnering in the promotion of professional qualities, accountability, restraint, and institutional capacity and the ministries that govern them, confidence-building: transparency and open communications for ISF forces until the 2011 deadline.
Rand 2010(Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave” http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:UcqID26FZkgJ:scholar.google.com/+US+need+military+presence+in+Iraq%22after+withdrawal%22 &hl=en&as_sdt=4000000001&as_ylo=2006,. MX) In any case, the United States faces the sober reality that its ability to prevent large-scale conflict between the main political players has limits and will decline as the U.S. military presence does. The greatest U.S. leverage will be from its support for improved ISF capabilities and operations. But this will contribute to Iraq’s security and stability only if the strengthened ISF behave responsibly, apolitically, and in the interests of a unified Iraqi state rather than those of would-be Shi’a rulers. The fact that the current prime minister is usurping control over key security functions and forces suggests that the danger of a strong but partisan ISF may get worse, presenting the United States with a difficult and delicate task. In this light, the long-term U.S.-Iraq military cooperation, extending beyond the withdrawal of U.S. forces, if mutually agreed, should have three missions: • capability-building: aiding in the training, equipping, advising, and operational support of ISF • character-building: partnering in the promotion of professional qualities, accountability, restraint, and institutional capacity of the ISF and the ministries that govern them • confidence-building: transparency and open communications. The third mission, confidence-building, pertains especially to the two state forces in Iraq provided for constitutionally: the ISF of the GoI, and the internal security forces (i.e., Peshmerga) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The potential for hostilities between these forces, if and as Kurd-Arab disputes fester and tensions rise, is great enough that the United States (alternatively, the United Nations) should offer to embed significant numbers of personnel with both forces to help avert misunderstanding, miscalculation, incidents, and crises.
PMCs DA
Redeployment to Afghanistan
Iraqi Election Politics (from Generic)
Leadership Imperialism is good for Iraq
Israel Relations disad
IRAQ POLICY
ISF PIC -
keep trainers until 2011 deadline with stability NB (See Iraq Colonialism)
PIC out of Air Force
with stability NB and Turkish relations
US bombings in Northern Iraq are key to US Turkey relations key to Iraq stabilization RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization June 14, 2010 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini and Robert A. Guffey (“The Middle East After the Iraq War THE IRAQ EFFECT”)
Turkey regional balancing key to solve stability and contain Iran
Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy, international trade, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. July 8, 2010. (“Welcome to the Post-Unipolar World: Great for the U.S. and for the Rest” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11967)
Timetable CP
CP Text: The United States federal government should request that the deadline for the withdrawal of all US troops as per the United States-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement be extended to 2020.
The current timetable is too fast—it gives Iraq no time to readjust and turns the case—a slower timetable solves
James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation., "Charting U.S. Policy after Iraq’s Elections", 3/5/10, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections
Torture CP
CP TEXT: The United States federal government should launch an impartial non-partisan commission of inquiry into its current and former torture practices
CP Text: The USfg should fund international charities.
Providing international charities with funding increases US soft power.
Garry W. Jenkins, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, “ 2006-2007, Soft Power, Strategic Security and International Philanthropy”, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 773, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Pagehandle=hein.journals/nclr85&div=25&g_sent=1&collection=journals, CY
T - Reduce
Advantage CPs -- Charities CP to solve soft power, Ban Torture CP to solve soft power & terrorism
Iraqi Election Politics
Redeployment DA (Afghanistan)
PMCs DA
Security K with the following links: stability, soft power, leadership/heg
Dems Bad (Agenda or Midterms)
case turns: withdrawal jacks stability, oil (with stability, econ, Iran takeover, higher oil prices --> Iraqi military modernization --> Kurdish civil war), soft power link and impact turns (Iranian prolif, human rights), link turns for democracy promotion
Israel Relations Disad
AFGHANISTAN STOP THE SURGE
T reduce must be pre-existing
Israel Relations Disad
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
To resolve the issues of the war in Afghanistan, we need to take a more traditional route – a Jirga as promised by Karzai would resolve many of the past grievances
CARLOTTA GALL, Ms. Gall was educated in England and read Russian and French at Newnham College, Cambridge. She received a Master's degree from City University, London in International Relations and Journalism. She speaks three languages. Carlotta Gall is a reporter covering Pakistan and Afghanistan for The New York Times; she has been based in Afghanistan since November 2001. Jun 01, 2010 [“Afghan Assembly Expected to Back Peace-Talk Plan” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?_r=1?pagewanted=print?pagewanted=print?pagewanted=print]
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation
CP Text: The United States federal government should publically adopt a Zero-Civilian Casualty doctrine. The United States federal government should establish a Status of Forces Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and allocate funds to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization collateral damage compensation fund. A Zero-Civilian Casualty approach is the internal link to counterinsurgency without withdrawing troops
Karl F. Inderfurth, a professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, served as U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs from 1997 to 2001, May 29, 2007, “Losing the 'other war' in Afghanistan” http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/opinion/29iht-edinderfurth.1.5912726.html TP
WASHINGTON — Controversy rages over the war in Iraq, but what about the so-called other war in Afghanistan, for which there is strong bipartisan support in the United States and in the international community? Is there a danger of losing in Afghanistan? The answer is yes. Almost six years after U.S.- led military forces removed the Taliban and its Qaeda support network from power, major challenges are seriously undermining popular support and trust in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai: A resurgent Taliban and a growing sense of insecurity throughout the country, including Kabul; rampant corruption, ineffective law enforcement and a weak judicial system; a failure to provide social services, lagging reconstruction and high unemployment; a booming drug trade and too many warlords. Now another challenge is rising to the top of that list - the increasing civilian death toll. Last year more than a thousand Afghans died. Three quarters were killed in Taliban attacks, many deliberately aimed at civilians. But some 230 innocent Afghans also died as a result of air strikes and ground operations by U.S. military and NATO forces. This year those numbers are on the rise. Since March there have been at least six incidents in which Western troops, mainly those under American command, have been accused of killing Afghan civilians, with more than 135 deaths reported and many more wounded. According to Red Cross, bombing by U.S. forces in western Afghanistan last month destroyed or badly damaged some 170 houses and left almost 2,000 people in four villages homeless. Mounting civilian casualties are turning Afghans against the nearly 45,000 U.S. and NATO troops in their country, provoking demonstrations and a motion in the upper house of Parliament to set a date for their withdrawal. These incidents also provide a propaganda windfall and new recruits for the Taliban. Karzai has told U.S. and NATO commanders that the patience of the Afghan people is wearing thin. He said civilian deaths and aggressive, arbitrary searches of people's houses have reached an unacceptable level, adding "Afghans cannot put up with it any longer." Several actions are needed to address this problem. First, the United States and NATO should publicly adopt the goal of "zero innocent civilian casualties," as recommended a year ago by retired General Barry McCaffrey after a trip to Afghanistan. To accomplish this, military tactics must change to limit casualties even where this means, in McCaffrey's words, "Taliban units escape destruction by hiding among the people." Second, more must be done to put "an Afghan face on operations," as called for by the former NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Richards of Britain. This means closer coordination on military operations with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Afghan National Army. Afghan soldiers should also be included in U.S. and NATO military actions to act as a buffer, a longstanding demand of Karzai. It is also imperative to work more closely with the local authorities and do more to respect Afghan sensibilities. U.S. and NATO policies regarding house searches and detentions of residents should be reconsidered. Third, the United States should conclude a Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan. Such an agreement is intended to clarify the legal terms under which a foreign military is allowed to operate in a country, including locations of bases and access to facilities as well as matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilians. Nearly six years into the U.S. military campaign, a formal, binding understanding with the Afghan government is needed, in part to underscore the political message that the U.S. military is there at the invitation of the Afghan people, not as an "occupier" (which some Afghans are beginning to feel that it is). Finally, NATO should set up a compensation fund for civilian deaths, injuries or property damage resulting from its military operations in Afghanistan. Since 2002 the United States has appropriated more than $12 million to help Afghan civilians harmed by U.S. operations. The funds are used for medical, rehabilitation and reconstruction aid. But NATO, as a whole, does not have an equivalent program.
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
Case Turns - Jirga bad (womens rights violations)
The Jirga in Afghanistan shatters Women’s Rights.
Golnar Motevalli, Journalist, May 30th 2010, Women Worry Afghan peace jirga will harm rights, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64T0ND20100530, M.E (Reuters) - As Afghanistan's most powerful men arrive in Kabul for a major conference aimed at starting a peace process with the Taliban, many women are worried the event could lead to a compromise of their hard-won rights. Afghanistan is holding a peace jirga or an assembly of powerful leaders, tribal elders and representatives of civil society to consider plans to open talks with Taliban leaders in an effort to end the nine-year conflict. A possible return of the Taliban has touched off concern about the fate of women who were banned from schools, the work place and public life during the Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001. "I would not expect the peace jirga to do anything good for women. My hope is that it will recognize their presence and protect their rights equally to men, as presented in the constitution," said Orzala Ashraf Nemat, a leading women's rights activist in Kabul. "I'm really tired of this strategy and plans and jargon. I'd like to see activists from all 34 provinces to come to Kabul and plan a much deeper understanding of what should be done in the future for women," she said.
The Jirga System is a traditional system of justice being practiced in rural Sindh as well as Balochistan and NWFP. There is a common perception that there is a sufficient link between the growing incidents of violence against women especially the cases of Karo Kari in Sindh and the tribal jirgas. The study seeks to identify the overall impact of tribal jirga system on the cases of karo kari in Sindh. Quantities research methodology has been adopted in the data collection process. Secondary data was collection from libraries, internet, bookshops as well as government institutions. Tools of in- depth interviews, focus group discussions and case studies were used to collect wide-ranging primary data on the research problem. Major findings of the study show that the codes, rules, regulations as well as verdicts of tribal jirgas are completely opposed to not only the formal law and the constitution of Pakistan but also international standards of human rights. For example, in the eyes of tribal jirga, killing a woman in the name of honour is not a crime. Tribal jirga in place of considering the women killed as victim, considers the killer as a victim and grieved party, and in its process of verdict ensures compensation for the killer of the women and his family. Tribal jirga provides no opportunities to the accused women to defend themselves against the allegations leveled against them, but considers the testimony of their male relatives as the final word to declare women as Kari. Moreover, the women who decide on their own to marry any man of their choice are also declared Kari by the tribal jirga, despite their legal nikah. While thoroughly examining the codes, rules, regulations and verdicts of the tribal jirga the study concludes that there are sufficient negative impacts of tribal jirgas on violence against women especially the cases of karo kari in Sindh, as the tribal jirgas not only provide relief to the killers but even encourage them on killing a women in the name of karo kari by providing them compensation in the form of cash or women. As a result by being encouraged by the tribal jirga, people usually kill their women on the baseless allegations of karo kari so as to extract money or other benefits from the men accused of being karo. The study recommendations strict ban on holding tribal jirgas, by further improving the laws which impose ban such jirgas as well as improving the implementation mechanisms for such laws. The study also suggests reforms in the country’s formal criminal laws as well as the laws dealing with violence against women. It also suggests that domestic violence be legally declared as criminal offence and procedure of getting FIR registered against the accused be made easy and simple for the women. The study also recommends increasing awareness and education in the rural society to root out the ages old tribal tradition of karo kari
AFGHANISTAN COUNTER-NARCOTICS
Provincial Leaders Cooperation CP with Warlords Reps K NB and withdrawal bad NB
Legalize Opium CP for medical morphine with cancer/AIDS NB, withdrawal bad NB
US funds Saffron CP, withdrawal bad NB
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
case turns - drones replace counternarcotics
Military presence T
Provincial Leaders Cooperation CP with Warlords Reps K NB and withdrawal bad NB
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
military presence T
AFGHANISTAN DRONES
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism, i-law is biopolitical
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation - with CMR, Heg and withdrawal bad NB
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
T presence -Pakistan is extra T
UCAV CP (removes attack drones, leaves surveillance) with Politics NB, surveillance key to solve terrorism
CMR disad
Heg disad
case turns: UCAV key military strat, War on Terror, & environment; i-law jacks US war on terror, democratic backsliding, totalitarianism
JAPAN OKINAWA K
Energy Bill Good
Redeployment to Guam
Rearm
Cap K with Identity Politics links
Japan Conditions CP (from generic)
Japan Politics (from generic)
Gender K (from generic) with speaking for others links
Jurisdictions CP - have Japan try troops
JAPAN POLICY
case turns: withdrawal hurts alliance, consumption tax bad for economy, China rise bad (Taiwan, democracy, terrorism)
Redeployment to Guam
Energy Bill Good
Compensation disad
Security K
JAPAN BMD
Deployment PIC that ends development but keeps deployment, with China aggression NB, Japan rearm NB, NK aggression
Redeployment to Guam
Energy Bill Good
Compensation disad
Security K
T weapons systems - only prepositioned equipment
T its = sole possession, joint treaty means not part of US military presence
JAPAN/SOUTH KOREA OFFSHORE BALANCING
case turns - China rise bad (terrorism, democracy, Taiwan), Chinese modernization causes East Asian prolif
Japan Politics and/or South Korea politics
Security K
Dems Bad Midterms
Redeployment to Guam
Stop Taiwan Arms Sales CP with withdrawal bad, SK/Japan politics. (2 versions: stop sales, condition stopping sales)
Yokota PIC with North Korean deterrence NB
SOUTH KOREA PROSTITUTION
SK passes Equal Employment Act CP with withdrawal bad
SK should revise SOFA to give ROK full jurisdiction for prosecuting military crimes CP with withdrawal bad NBs
Energy Bill Good Politics
Korean Politics (generic)
Korean Economy disad (generic)
Victimization K (may be read as case turns with prostitution/sexual slavery reps bad)
Compensation disad
South Korea rearm
Gender K with speaking for others links
case turns: presence key to econ
SOUTH KOREA MILITARY EXERCISES
case turns - China rise bad (terrorism, democracy, Taiwan), Chinese modernization causes East Asian prolif
South Korea politics
Security K
Dems Bad Midterms
Redeployment to Guam
Stop Taiwan Arms Sales CP with withdrawal bad, SK/Japan politics. (2 versions: stop sales, condition stopping sales)
T military presence
Table of Contents
IRAQ COLONIALISM
keep trainers until the 2011 deadline with stability NB, Obama Good Politics (likely Energy Bill, climate accesses imperialism)ISF PIC -
CP TEXT: The United States federal government should withdraw military and police presence from Iraq except for keeping forces for capability-building: aiding in the training, equipping, advising, and operational support, character-building: partnering in the promotion of professional qualities, accountability, restraint, and institutional capacity and the ministries that govern them, confidence-building: transparency and open communications for ISF forces until the 2011 deadline.
Rand 2010(Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave” http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:UcqID26FZkgJ:scholar.google.com/+US+need+military+presence+in+Iraq%22after+withdrawal%22
&hl=en&as_sdt=4000000001&as_ylo=2006,. MX)
In any case, the United States faces the sober reality that its ability to prevent large-scale conflict between the main political players has limits and will decline as the U.S. military presence does. The greatest U.S. leverage will be from its support for improved ISF capabilities and operations. But this will contribute to Iraq’s security and stability only if the strengthened ISF behave responsibly, apolitically, and in the interests of a unified Iraqi state rather than those of would-be Shi’a rulers. The fact that the current prime minister is usurping control over key security functions and forces suggests that the danger of a strong but partisan ISF may get worse, presenting the United States with a difficult and delicate task. In this light, the long-term U.S.-Iraq military cooperation, extending beyond the withdrawal of U.S. forces, if mutually agreed, should have three missions: • capability-building: aiding in the training, equipping, advising, and operational support of ISF • character-building: partnering in the promotion of professional qualities, accountability, restraint, and institutional capacity of the ISF and the ministries that govern them • confidence-building: transparency and open communications. The third mission, confidence-building, pertains especially to the two state forces in Iraq provided for constitutionally: the ISF of the GoI, and the internal security forces (i.e., Peshmerga) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The potential for hostilities between these forces, if and as Kurd-Arab disputes fester and tensions rise, is great enough that the United States (alternatively, the United Nations) should offer to embed significant numbers of personnel with both forces to help avert misunderstanding, miscalculation, incidents, and crises.
PMCs DA
Redeployment to Afghanistan
Iraqi Election Politics (from Generic)
Leadership Imperialism is good for Iraq
Israel Relations disad
IRAQ POLICY
keep trainers until 2011 deadline with stability NB (See Iraq Colonialism)ISF PIC -
with stability NB and Turkish relationsPIC out of Air Force
US bombings in Northern Iraq are key to US Turkey relations key to Iraq stabilization
RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization June 14, 2010 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini and Robert A. Guffey (“The Middle East After the Iraq War THE IRAQ EFFECT”)
Turkey regional balancing key to solve stability and contain Iran
Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy, international trade, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. July 8, 2010. (“Welcome to the Post-Unipolar World: Great for the U.S. and for the Rest” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11967)
Timetable CP
CP Text: The United States federal government should request that the deadline for the withdrawal of all US troops as per the United States-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement be extended to 2020.
The current timetable is too fast—it gives Iraq no time to readjust and turns the case—a slower timetable solves
James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation., "Charting U.S. Policy after Iraq’s Elections", 3/5/10, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections
Torture CP
CP TEXT: The United States federal government should launch an impartial non-partisan commission of inquiry into its current and former torture practices
Britain has urged the US to launch their own investigation but Obama refuses
Amnesty International July 7, 2010 (“United Kingdom to Launch Torture Inquiry; United States Should Follow Suit” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amnesty-international/uk-to-launch-torture-inqu_b_637662.html)
Torture breed terrorism and is ineffective, a commission into its former practices would solve for US reputation and prevent its use in the future
Andrew Foster Connors pastor of the Brown Memorial Park Avenue Presbyterian Church July 13, 2010 (“Let's learn from the past on torture” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-07-13/news/bs-ed-torture-20100713_1_word-torture-detainees-interrogations)
Charities CP
CP Text: The USfg should fund international charities.
Providing international charities with funding increases US soft power.
Garry W. Jenkins, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, “ 2006-2007, Soft Power, Strategic Security and International Philanthropy”, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 773, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Pagehandle=hein.journals/nclr85&div=25&g_sent=1&collection=journals, CY
T - Reduce
Advantage CPs -- Charities CP to solve soft power, Ban Torture CP to solve soft power & terrorism
Security K with the following links: stability, soft power, leadership/hegIraqi Election Politics
Redeployment DA (Afghanistan)
PMCs DA
case turns: withdrawal jacks stability, oil (with stability, econ, Iran takeover, higher oil prices --> Iraqi military modernization --> Kurdish civil war), soft power link and impact turns (Iranian prolif, human rights), link turns for democracy promotionDems Bad (Agenda or Midterms)
Israel Relations Disad
AFGHANISTAN STOP THE SURGE
T reduce must be pre-existing
Israel Relations Disad
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
To resolve the issues of the war in Afghanistan, we need to take a more traditional route – a Jirga as promised by Karzai would resolve many of the past grievances
CARLOTTA GALL, Ms. Gall was educated in England and read Russian and French at Newnham College, Cambridge. She received a Master's degree from City University, London in International Relations and Journalism. She speaks three languages. Carlotta Gall is a reporter covering Pakistan and Afghanistan for The New York Times; she has been based in Afghanistan since November 2001. Jun 01, 2010 [“Afghan Assembly Expected to Back Peace-Talk Plan” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?_r=1?pagewanted=print?pagewanted=print?pagewanted=print]
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation
CP Text: The United States federal government should publically adopt a Zero-Civilian Casualty doctrine. The United States federal government should establish a Status of Forces Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and allocate funds to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization collateral damage compensation fund.
A Zero-Civilian Casualty approach is the internal link to counterinsurgency without withdrawing troops
Karl F. Inderfurth, a professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, served as U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs from 1997 to 2001, May 29, 2007, “Losing the 'other war' in Afghanistan” http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/opinion/29iht-edinderfurth.1.5912726.html TP
WASHINGTON — Controversy rages over the war in Iraq, but what about the so-called other war in Afghanistan, for which there is strong bipartisan support in the United States and in the international community? Is there a danger of losing in Afghanistan? The answer is yes. Almost six years after U.S.- led military forces removed the Taliban and its Qaeda support network from power, major challenges are seriously undermining popular support and trust in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai: A resurgent Taliban and a growing sense of insecurity throughout the country, including Kabul; rampant corruption, ineffective law enforcement and a weak judicial system; a failure to provide social services, lagging reconstruction and high unemployment; a booming drug trade and too many warlords. Now another challenge is rising to the top of that list - the increasing civilian death toll. Last year more than a thousand Afghans died. Three quarters were killed in Taliban attacks, many deliberately aimed at civilians. But some 230 innocent Afghans also died as a result of air strikes and ground operations by U.S. military and NATO forces. This year those numbers are on the rise. Since March there have been at least six incidents in which Western troops, mainly those under American command, have been accused of killing Afghan civilians, with more than 135 deaths reported and many more wounded. According to Red Cross, bombing by U.S. forces in western Afghanistan last month destroyed or badly damaged some 170 houses and left almost 2,000 people in four villages homeless. Mounting civilian casualties are turning Afghans against the nearly 45,000 U.S. and NATO troops in their country, provoking demonstrations and a motion in the upper house of Parliament to set a date for their withdrawal. These incidents also provide a propaganda windfall and new recruits for the Taliban. Karzai has told U.S. and NATO commanders that the patience of the Afghan people is wearing thin. He said civilian deaths and aggressive, arbitrary searches of people's houses have reached an unacceptable level, adding "Afghans cannot put up with it any longer." Several actions are needed to address this problem. First, the United States and NATO should publicly adopt the goal of "zero innocent civilian casualties," as recommended a year ago by retired General Barry McCaffrey after a trip to Afghanistan. To accomplish this, military tactics must change to limit casualties even where this means, in McCaffrey's words, "Taliban units escape destruction by hiding among the people." Second, more must be done to put "an Afghan face on operations," as called for by the former NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Richards of Britain. This means closer coordination on military operations with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Afghan National Army. Afghan soldiers should also be included in U.S. and NATO military actions to act as a buffer, a longstanding demand of Karzai. It is also imperative to work more closely with the local authorities and do more to respect Afghan sensibilities. U.S. and NATO policies regarding house searches and detentions of residents should be reconsidered. Third, the United States should conclude a Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan. Such an agreement is intended to clarify the legal terms under which a foreign military is allowed to operate in a country, including locations of bases and access to facilities as well as matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilians. Nearly six years into the U.S. military campaign, a formal, binding understanding with the Afghan government is needed, in part to underscore the political message that the U.S. military is there at the invitation of the Afghan people, not as an "occupier" (which some Afghans are beginning to feel that it is). Finally, NATO should set up a compensation fund for civilian deaths, injuries or property damage resulting from its military operations in Afghanistan. Since 2002 the United States has appropriated more than $12 million to help Afghan civilians harmed by U.S. operations. The funds are used for medical, rehabilitation and reconstruction aid. But NATO, as a whole, does not have an equivalent program.
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
Case Turns - Jirga bad (womens rights violations)
The Jirga in Afghanistan shatters Women’s Rights.
Golnar Motevalli, Journalist, May 30th 2010, Women Worry Afghan peace jirga will harm rights, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64T0ND20100530, M.E
(Reuters) - As Afghanistan's most powerful men arrive in Kabul for a major conference aimed at starting a peace process with the Taliban, many women are worried the event could lead to a compromise of their hard-won rights. Afghanistan is holding a peace jirga or an assembly of powerful leaders, tribal elders and representatives of civil society to consider plans to open talks with Taliban leaders in an effort to end the nine-year conflict. A possible return of the Taliban has touched off concern about the fate of women who were banned from schools, the work place and public life during the Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001. "I would not expect the peace jirga to do anything good for women. My hope is that it will recognize their presence and protect their rights equally to men, as presented in the constitution," said Orzala Ashraf Nemat, a leading women's rights activist in Kabul. "I'm really tired of this strategy and plans and jargon. I'd like to see activists from all 34 provinces to come to Kabul and plan a much deeper understanding of what should be done in the future for women," she said.
Preventing Jirgas will ensure better women’s rights and an end to violence.
Participatory Development Initiatives, Role of Tribal Jirga in Violence Against Women, 2005, http://www.pdi.org.pk/reports/PDI%20Study%20on%20Role%20of%20Jirga%20in%20Honor%20Killing.pdf, M.E
The Jirga System is a traditional system of justice being practiced in rural Sindh as well as Balochistan and NWFP. There is a common perception that there is a sufficient link between the growing incidents of violence against women especially the cases of Karo Kari in Sindh and the tribal jirgas. The study seeks to identify the overall impact of tribal jirga system on the cases of karo kari in Sindh. Quantities research methodology has been adopted in the data collection process. Secondary data was collection from libraries, internet, bookshops as well as government institutions. Tools of in- depth interviews, focus group discussions and case studies were used to collect wide-ranging primary data on the research problem. Major findings of the study show that the codes, rules, regulations as well as verdicts of tribal jirgas are completely opposed to not only the formal law and the constitution of Pakistan but also international standards of human rights. For example, in the eyes of tribal jirga, killing a woman in the name of honour is not a crime. Tribal jirga in place of considering the women killed as victim, considers the killer as a victim and grieved party, and in its process of verdict ensures compensation for the killer of the women and his family. Tribal jirga provides no opportunities to the accused women to defend themselves against the allegations leveled against them, but considers the testimony of their male relatives as the final word to declare women as Kari. Moreover, the women who decide on their own to marry any man of their choice are also declared Kari by the tribal jirga, despite their legal nikah. While thoroughly examining the codes, rules, regulations and verdicts of the tribal jirga the study concludes that there are sufficient negative impacts of tribal jirgas on violence against women especially the cases of karo kari in Sindh, as the tribal jirgas not only provide relief to the killers but even encourage them on killing a women in the name of karo kari by providing them compensation in the form of cash or women. As a result by being encouraged by the tribal jirga, people usually kill their women on the baseless allegations of karo kari so as to extract money or other benefits from the men accused of being karo. The study recommendations strict ban on holding tribal jirgas, by further improving the laws which impose ban such jirgas as well as improving the implementation mechanisms for such laws. The study also suggests reforms in the country’s formal criminal laws as well as the laws dealing with violence against women. It also suggests that domestic violence be legally declared as criminal offence and procedure of getting FIR registered against the accused be made easy and simple for the women. The study also recommends increasing awareness and education in the rural society to root out the ages old tribal tradition of karo kari
AFGHANISTAN COUNTER-NARCOTICS
Provincial Leaders Cooperation CP with Warlords Reps K NB and withdrawal bad NBLegalize Opium CP for medical morphine with cancer/AIDS NB, withdrawal bad NB
US funds Saffron CP, withdrawal bad NB
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
case turns - drones replace counternarcotics
Military presence T
AFGHANISTAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY / COUNTER-TERRORISM
Provincial Leaders Cooperation CP with Warlords Reps K NB and withdrawal bad NBJirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal bad
PMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
military presence T
AFGHANISTAN DRONES
Jirga CP (2 versions) - enforce the Jirga or have another Jirga, competes with withdrawal badPMC Shift
Dems Good (Agenda or Midterms)
Security K with failed state links, Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism, i-law is biopolitical
Zero Casualty CP - fiats US offer SOFA, zero civilian casualty doctrine, US fund NATO collateral damage compensation - with CMR, Heg and withdrawal bad NB
Karzai Politics and/or Elections disad
T presence -Pakistan is extra T
UCAV CP (removes attack drones, leaves surveillance) with Politics NB, surveillance key to solve terrorism
CMR disad
Heg disad
case turns: UCAV key military strat, War on Terror, & environment; i-law jacks US war on terror, democratic backsliding, totalitarianism
JAPAN OKINAWA K
Energy Bill GoodRedeployment to Guam
Rearm
Cap K with Identity Politics links
Japan Conditions CP (from generic)
Japan Politics (from generic)
Gender K (from generic) with speaking for others links
Jurisdictions CP - have Japan try troops
JAPAN POLICY
case turns: withdrawal hurts alliance, consumption tax bad for economy, China rise bad (Taiwan, democracy, terrorism)Redeployment to Guam
Energy Bill Good
Compensation disad
Security K
JAPAN BMD
Deployment PIC that ends development but keeps deployment, with China aggression NB, Japan rearm NB, NK aggressionRedeployment to Guam
Energy Bill Good
Compensation disad
Security K
T weapons systems - only prepositioned equipment
T its = sole possession, joint treaty means not part of US military presence
JAPAN/SOUTH KOREA OFFSHORE BALANCING
case turns - China rise bad (terrorism, democracy, Taiwan), Chinese modernization causes East Asian prolifJapan Politics and/or South Korea politics
Security K
Dems Bad Midterms
Redeployment to Guam
Stop Taiwan Arms Sales CP with withdrawal bad, SK/Japan politics. (2 versions: stop sales, condition stopping sales)
Yokota PIC with North Korean deterrence NB
SOUTH KOREA PROSTITUTION
SK passes Equal Employment Act CP with withdrawal badSK should revise SOFA to give ROK full jurisdiction for prosecuting military crimes CP with withdrawal bad NBs
Energy Bill Good Politics
Korean Politics (generic)
Korean Economy disad (generic)
Victimization K (may be read as case turns with prostitution/sexual slavery reps bad)
Compensation disad
South Korea rearm
Gender K with speaking for others links
case turns: presence key to econ
SOUTH KOREA MILITARY EXERCISES
case turns - China rise bad (terrorism, democracy, Taiwan), Chinese modernization causes East Asian prolifSouth Korea politics
Security K
Dems Bad Midterms
Redeployment to Guam
Stop Taiwan Arms Sales CP with withdrawal bad, SK/Japan politics. (2 versions: stop sales, condition stopping sales)
T military presence
SOUTH KOREA NAVAL EXERCISES
same as military exercises + T "in"TURKISH TNWs
OBJECTIVISM